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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE 
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED THE 
AUTHORITY EXPLICITLY GRANTED TO HIM BY THE PARTIES AND 
THUS THE ARBITRATOR LACKED JURISDICTION TO RULE ON 
ISSUES CONCERNING PLAT B. 
In the Brief of Appellee, Orton argues that "the Plat B issues 
were properly submitted to the arbitrator." Both the plain language 
of the Agreement to Arbitrate and Utah case law indicate otherwise. 
"It is of course fundamental that the authority of the 
arbitrator springs from the agreement to arbitrate." Swift Indus., 
Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3rd Cir. 1972); see 
5 
also Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 
949 (Utah 1996) (stating that "to find that an arbitrator has 
exceeded his authority, a court must review the submission agreement 
and determine whether the arbitrator's award covers areas not 
contemplated by the submission agreement.").1 Moreover, "[t]he 
powers of an arbitrator are defined by agreement of the parties: the 
question they submit both establishes and limits the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction." IVestern Elec. Co. v. Communications Wkrs. of Am. , 450 
F.Supp. 876, 881 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (citations omitted); accord United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 
S.Ct. 1347, 1353 (1960) ("[A"rbitration is a matter of contract and 
a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which 
he has not agreed so to submit") ; United Food and Commercial Workers, 
Local Union No. 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 946 (10th 
Cir. 1989); Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. Sav-On 
Groceries, 508 F.2d 500, 502-03 (10th Cir. 1975) .2 Contrary to the 
lrThe exceeding authority or powers ground is a statutory ground 
for vacating an arbitration award. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-
14(c) and 78-31a-15(b). 
2In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593, 80 S.Ct. 1358 (1960), the United States Supreme Court emphasized 
that 
an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and 
application of the collective bargaining 
agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own 
brand of industrial justice. He may of course 
look for guidance from many sources, yet his 
award is legitimate only so long as it draws its 
essence from the collective bargaining 
6 
position asserted throughout the Brief of Appellee, xx[i]t is the 
reviewing court's duty to determine whether the arbitrator has acted 
within that jurisdiction." Id. 
In a recent opinion that discusses the exceeding the 
arbitrator's authority ground for vacating an arbitrator's award, the 
Utah Supreme Court, in Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pacific 
R.R. Co., 961 P.2d 320 (Utah 1998),3 stated the following: 
We have clearly held under the above 
statutory framework [i.e., the Utah Arbitration 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-l, et seq.] for 
vacating an arbitration award that an arbitrator 
exceeds his or her powers if the arbitrator 
strays beyond the scope of the questions 
submitted for arbitration by the parties. See 
Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949. The scope of 
the parties' dispute as defined in their written 
agreement to arbitrate establishes the scope of 
the arbitrator's authority in resolving the 
conflict. 
Id. at 323 (emphasis added). The supreme court further stated that 
"[a]n arbitration award purporting to resolve questions beyond that 
jurisdictional boundary is not valid." Id. "For a court to find 
that an arbitrator has exceeded his or her delegated authority, the 
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest 
an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no 
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. 
Id. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361. 
3The Utah Supreme Court's opinion set forth in Intermountain 
Power Agency v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 961 P.2d 320 (Utah 1998), 
which was issued July 7, 1998, is not cited in the Brief of Appellee. 
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court must determine that "xthe arbitrator's award covers areas not 
contemplated by the submission agreement.'" (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the Agreement to Arbitrate, which was 
drafted by Orton7s legal counsel, states that the parties 
''acknowledge that the issues relating to the above-referenced Plat B 
of Riderwood Village have been resolved, and that, therefore, the 
arbitration will focus on the remaining issues of the dispute, those 
which relate to Plat C, thereby resolving all remaining issues in the 
case."4 See R. 145, Agreement to Arbitrate, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached as Addendum A to the Brief of Appellant 
(emphasis added). 
A. THE ALLEGED MODIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO 
ARBITRATE CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO PLAT B, 
AS UNILATERALLY CLAIMED BY ORTON, IS VOID AND 
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT WAS NEITHER AGREED UPON 
NOR EVIDENCED BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Agreement to Arbitrate limited 
the authority and jurisdiction of the arbitrator to those issues 
involving only Plat C, Orton, in his Brief, argues that "[t]he 
Agreement to Arbitrate was modified by mutual consent." See Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 13-21. Orton7s argument, however, is fatally flawed in 
light of the plain language of the Agreement to Arbitrate, not to 
4At both page 14 and at the bottom of page 16 of the Brief of 
Appellee, Orton admits that the Arbitration Agreement between the 
parties, which Orton's legal counsel drafted, "ostensibly limits" the 
arbitrator's authority or jurisdiction to ruling on issues relating 
to Plat C only. 
8 
mention that the Utah Arbitration Act, as interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court,, requires that all agreements to arbitrate be in 
writing. 
In the recent arbitration case of Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P. 2d 
796 (Utah 1998),5 the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
We hold that an arbitration agreement must 
be written to be enforceable under section 78-
31a-4. Section 78-31a-3 provides that only 
"written agreement[s] " to submit a claim to 
arbitration are "valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable." The logical extension of this 
language is that until an agreement to arbitrate 
is reduced to writing, it is invalid, 
unenforceable, and revocable.6 
Id. at 800 (brackets included); accord Russell v. World Famous, Inc., 
767 P.2d 456, 457 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) ("Agreements to arbitrate 
must be in writing"); Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Pacific Molasses 
Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1982). The Utah Supreme Court 
reasoned that "[b]y employing the language 'arbitration agreement' in 
both the title to section 78-31a-3 and the body of § 78-31a-4(l), the 
Legislature signaled a correlation between the two sections. Thus, 
mandating 'written agreement[s]' under section 78-31a-3 is tantamount 
50rton failed to cite to or otherwise recognize the Utah Supreme 
Court's opinion in Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998), 
which was issued on July 10, 1998. 
6
"Whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable is a question 
of law, and therefore, the appellate court reviews the trial court's 
determination, which in the instant case was a confirmation of the 
arbitrator's award, for correctness. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 
796, 798 (Utah 1998) . 
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to requiring a party to prove a written 'arbitration agreement' under 
section 78-31a-4." Id. (brackets included and footnote omitted). 
In the case at bar, the express language of the Agreement to 
Arbitrate limits the jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator to 
determining only those issues relating to Plat C. See R. 145, 
Agreement to Arbitrate, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
as Addendum A to the Brief of Appellant. Thus, it follows, that the 
alleged modification concerning Plat B of the Agreement to Arbitrate, 
being unwritten, is void and unenforceable. See Intermountain Power 
Agency v. Union Pacific R.R., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998) ("The 
scope of the parties' dispute as defined in their written agreement 
to arbitrate establishes the scope of the arbitrator's authority in 
resolving the conflict"). 
Orton argues that unilateral and unacknowledged correspondence 
from his legal counsel to legal counsel for Pacific Development, 
L.C., somehow establishes that the written Agreement to Arbitrate, 
which was drafted by Orton's legal counsel, was modified to include 
issues concerning Plat B. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 17-19. A 
closer review of the correspondence referenced by Orton in his Brief, 
however, reveals the inaccuracy of Orton's position. 
The letter, dated April 28, 1997, from Orton's legal counsel to 
legal counsel for Pacific Development, L.C., which preceded the 
Agreement to Arbitrate, stated the following: 
10 
I also understand from that same 
conversation that Plat B was essentially at a 
break even, and the amounts owing are on Plat C. 
I understand that to mean that the signed and 
unsigned change orders on Plat B are no longer 
contested, and that the only contested issues 
relate to the unsigned change orders on Plat C. 
See R. 213-19, Letter from Orton's legal counsel to counsel for 
Pacific Development, L.C., dated April 28, 1997, p. 1, %2 (emphasis 
added). The language of the above-referenced letter indicates that 
"Plat B was essentially at a break even", and that "the amounts owing 
[were] on Plat C." Shortly thereafter, the parties executed the 
Agreement to Arbitrate, which, consistent with the language of the 
April 28, 1997, letter, limits the scope of the arbitrator's 
authority to resolve issues relating only to Plat C. The fact that 
matters on Plat B were resolved and were at a "break even" point, is 
further confirmed by the second letter referenced by Orton, which is 
dated June 11, 1997, two days after the Agreement to Arbitrate was 
executed by the parties. In the June 11, 1997, letter, Orton's legal 
counsel clarified why the issues relating to Plat B were resolved. 
Orton's counsel stated the following: 
At one point, Otto claimed to have overpaid 
Orton Excavation on Plat "B" by $46,771.90. 
However, when all of the extras on Plat "B" are 
included (signed change orders = $21,907.85; 
unsigned change orders = $24,600.67; total = 
$46,508.52), those come to within $263.38 of the 
$46,771.90 that Belvedere claim to have 
overpaid. By agreeing to those extras and 
changes on Plat "B," that eliminates any 
remaining disputes on Plat "B." 
11 
See R. 209-11, Letter from Orton's legal counsel to counsel for 
Pacific Development, L.C., dated June 11, 1997, p. 2, ^3 (emphasis 
added). 
Orton's assertion concerning the correspondence or letters from 
his counsel is nullified because the letters were unacknowledged by 
counsel for Pacific Development, L.C. Further, other than the 
limiting language of the Agreement to Arbitrate, Orton points to 
nothing in terms of a writing between the parties to indicate the 
assent of Pacific Development, L.C., that the issues to be resolved 
by the arbitrator included Plat B. See Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 800; of. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (Supp. 1997) (providing that writing 
memorializing a contract within the statute of frauds must be 
"signed by the party to be charged with the agreement") and Guinand 
v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 199-200, 450 P.2d 467, 469 (1969) (holding 
that letter from party to be charged satisfied statute of frauds). 
B. NOTWITHSTANDING THE LANGUAGE IN THE AGREEMENT TO 
ARBITRATE THAT LIMITED THE ARBITRATOR'S 
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE ISSUES 
RELATING ONLY TO PLAT C, PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT, 
L.C.# OBJECTED THAT THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT HAVE 
THE AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE 
ISSUES RELATING TO PLAT B. 
Orton claims that Pacific Development, L.C., "at no time during 
the entire arbitration" objected to the arbitrator hearing or 
determining issues relating to Plat B. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 19 
and 20. This claim is a misrepresentation or both the record and 
12 
proceedings. Moreover, in light of the plain language in the 
Agreement to Arbitrate limiting the arbitrator's jurisdiction and 
authority to resolve issues relating only to Plat C, even if Pacific 
Development, L.C., did not object, such did not operate as a waiver. 
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional limitation of the arbitrator 
set forth in the Agreement to Arbitrate, during the course of the 
arbitration proceedings, Orton, through counsel, presented evidence 
on matters concerning both Plat B and Plat C. In addition to the 
evidence presented on Plat C, Pacific Development, L.C., presented 
evidence to counter the claims of Orton relating to Plat B. As 
evinced by way of its written closing argument submitted to the 
arbitrator, the primary purpose of the submission of evidence by 
Pacific Development, L.C., concerning Plat B was to establish the 
course of dealing and expectation between the parties for comparison 
of dealings between the parties on Plat C. See R. 201-04, Closing 
Argument submitted by Pacific Development, L.C., to the arbitrator. 
Such a comparison was important for purposes of establishing during 
the arbitration the breach by Orton Excavation of the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in the course of performing excavation 
services and products on Plat C. See R. 143, Final Arbitration 
Award, 1f3.7 
7Orton Excavation contracted with Pacific Development, L.C., to 
install culinary water, sanitary sewer, storm drain lines, and other 
excavation related services, including imported fill material, on 
Plats B and C. See Brief of Appellee, Statement of Fact No. 2. The 
13 
On November 7, 1997, the arbitrator issued his Interim 
Arbitration Award, thereby inviting, by virtue of its temporary 
nature, objections or comments concerning the award. See R. 187-92, 
Interim Arbitration Award. In that Interim Arbitration Award, the 
arbitrator, in direct contravention to the plain language of the 
parties' Agreement to Arbitrate, proceeded to rule on issues 
involving Plat B. Id. Thereafter, Pacific Development, L.C., 
objected to the interim award by filing a Motion for Reconsideration, 
objecting that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction and authority to 
rule on Plat B issues and requesting that the arbitrator reconsider 
its ruling in light of the well-established implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing that Orton breached in the course of using 
over three times the amount of fill material reasonably and fairly 
necessary to complete Plat C (See R. 181-85, Motion for 
Reconsideration). Shortly thereafter, Orton filed his Opposition to 
the Motion for Reconsideration (See R. 177-80, Opposition to Motion 
for Reconsideration). On December 24, 1997, the arbitrator issued 
his Final Arbitration Award, overruling the objections. See R. 138, 
Final Arbitration Award. 
As demonstrated above, Pacific Development, L.C., contrary to 
Orton's assertion, did in fact object to the arbitrator resolving 
parties executed a subcontract for Plat B on April 20, 1994. Id. 
Thereafter, on October 10, 1994, the parties executed a subcontract 
for Plat C. Id. 
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issues related to Plat B. Notwithstanding the detailed and written 
objection by Pacific Development, L.C., to the scope of arbitrator's 
authority, "participation in an arbitration does not waive an 
objection to the scope of the award." Russell v. World Famous, Inc., 
161 P.2d 456, 457 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Gamble et ux v. Sukut, 
208 Or. 480, 486-88, 302 P.2d 553 (1956)). The fact that a party 
does not waive objection to the scope of an arbitrator's award by 
participating in the arbitration is consonant with the well-
established legal principle that the confines of the arbitrator's 
authority to resolve conflicts, as defined by the parties written 
agreement, is jurisdictional in nature. See Intermountain Power 
Agency v. Union Pacific R.R. , 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998) ("An 
arbitration award purporting to resolve questions beyond that 
jurisdictional boundary is not valid"); Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 949 (Utah 1996) (citing Western 
Elec. Co. v. Communications Wkrs. Of Am., 450 F. Supp. 876, 881 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978)) ("It is the reviewing court's duty [under the 
exceeding authority test] to determine whether the arbitrator has 
acted within that jurisdiction"); Leahy v. Guaranty National Ins. 
Co., 907 P.2d 697, 699 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) ("The scope of an 
arbitration panel's jurisdiction depends upon the issues actually 
submitted to it for determination in the parties' proposals for 
arbitration"); Executone Infoimation Systems, Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 
1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It is well-settled that the arbitrator's 
15 
jurisdiction is defined by both the contract containing the 
arbitration clause and the submission agreement"); Coast Trading Co., 
Inc. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1982). 
Orton's argument concerning both the modification of the 
Agreement to Arbitrate and waiver are further undermined by the fact 
that "arbitration is a creature of contract." Matteson v. Ryder 
System Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 114 (3rd Cir. 1996). As in contract law, 
the touchstone for interpreting an agreement to arbitrate must be the 
intention of the parties. See Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 325 
(citing Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n, 910 P.2d 1223, 1225, 
1226 (Utah 1996)) ("We have clearly held that x[i]n the 
interpretation of a contract, the parties' intentions should be 
determined from the words of the Agreement") . Hence, the arbitrator 
should deduce the parties' contractual intent as to the scope of 
authority for resolving conflicts from the language of the Agreement. 
Id. After all, Mi]t is the parties, not the arbitrator, who decide 
the issues submitted . . . ." Matteson, 99 F.3d at 114; see also 
Intermountain Power, 961 P.2d at 323 ("An arbitration award 
purporting to resolve questions beyond that jurisdictional boundary 
[i.e., the written agreement to arbitrate] is not valid").8 
8At page 23 of the Brief of Appellee, Orton claims that the 
subcontract agreement between the parties "required all disputes to 
be submitted to arbitration." Orton's argument is in direct 
contravention to the plain language of the Agreement to Arbitrate, as 
executed by the parties, expressly limiting the arbitrator's 
authority and jurisdiction to resolve issues related to Plat C only. 
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II • BOTH THE INTERIM ARBITRATION AWARD AND THE FINAL 
ARBITRATION AWARD OF THE ARBITRATOR DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE HE MANIFESTLY DISREGARDED WELL-ESTABLISHED 
CONTRACT LAW CONCERNING BOTH THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND THE PROHIBITION OF 
ADDING TERMS TO A CONTRACT THAT THE PARTIES OMITTED. 
Orton, at page 2 6 of his Brief, erroneously asserts that "the 
'manifest disregard of the law" argument [sic] is not even adopted in 
Utah." In Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 
941 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court, in the course of analyzing 
the manifest disregard ground due to it being raised on appeal and 
relied upon by the trial court below, expressly reserved the issue of 
whether this ground is recognized in Utah inasmuch as the Buzas 
Baseball case was decided on other grounds. Id. at 951 n.8, 949. 
Thus, this issue is a matter of first impression directly before this 
Court.9 
The manifest disregard of the law ground for overturning an 
arbitration award is a judicially created doctrine that stems from 
the exceeding authority statutory ground.10 Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. 
Moreover, the record indicates that the parties agreed to submit the 
matter to arbitration rather than being compelled by language of the 
subcontract agreement to do so. See R. 123, Minute Entry 
(documenting the request by Orton's counsel to temporarily strike the 
scheduled trial dates for arbitration proceeding). 
9By discussing the analysis to be utilized in applying the ground 
of manifest disregard of the law, the Utah Supreme Court implied that 
it is a valid ground for vacating an arbitrator's award. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-31a-14. 
10A good part of Orton's Brief is dedicated to arguing that 
neither the district court nor this Court can reach the merits of the 
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Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996) (citing Wilko 
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37, 74 S. Ct. 182, 187 (1953) ("[T]he 
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators [, ] in contrast to 
manifest disregard[,] are not subject . . . to judicial review for 
error . . . ." (emphasis added)); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. 
Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2nd Cir. 
1960). "If arbitrators manifestly disregard the law in making their 
award, they can be said to have exceeded their authority.n11 Id.-, see 
also Eljer Manuf. , Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (stating that the arbitrator's decision will be set aside 
"if in reaching his result, the arbitrator deliberately disregards 
what he knows to be the law.") (citing Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992); Jenkins v. Prudential-
arbitrator1 s award. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 30-38. "Effusively 
deferential language notwithstanding, the courts are neither entitled 
nor encouraged simply to 'rubber stamp7 the interpretation and 
decisions of arbitrator." Matteson v. Ryder System Inc., 99 F.3d 108 
(3rd Cir. 1996) (citing Leed Architectural Prods., Inc. v. United 
Steelworkers of Am., Local 6674, 916 F.2d 63, 65 (2nd Cir. 1990) 
("this great deference, however, is not the equivalent of a grant of 
limitless power"). "Courts still maintain a significant role in the 
. arbitration process." Id. Moreover, "they have not been 
relegated to the status of merely offering post-hoc sanction for the 
action of arbitrators. Rare though they may be, there will be 
instances when it is appropriate for a court to vacate the decision 
of an arbitrator." Xd. at 113-14. The instant case is one of them. 
11The district court's determination that the arbitrator did not 
manifestly disregard the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is a conclusion of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness. DeVore v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 
1994). 
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Bache Sec. Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) (characterizing 
the "manifest disregard" standard as "willful inattentiveness to the 
governing law."); and Jeppson v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 879 
F.Supp. 1130, 1133 (D. Utah 1995) . According to the federal case law 
address the issue, 
Although the bounds of this ground have never been 
defined, it clearly means more than error or 
misunderstanding with respect to the law. The error 
must have been obvious and capable of being readily 
and instantly perceived by the average person 
qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the 
term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator 
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal 
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to 
it. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 
(2nd Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, the arbitrator, in his temporary or Interim 
Arbitration Award, arrived at the following determination concerning 
the claim that Pacific Development, L.C., was due a credit or offset 
for Orton Excavation utilizing too much fill material on Plat C: 
Pacific claims that it is entitled to a credit or 
offset to the claims of Orton alleging that Orton used 
too much imported material. The problem appears to be 
inherent to the unit price contract that was entered 
into by the parties. Unit price contracts have 
advantages and disadvantages. Pacific properly points 
out that under a unit price contract Orton has no 
incentive to be judicious in its use of material being 
paid for by the unit. On the other hand, Pacific only 
pays for what is actually used. Pacific, however, 
entered into the unit price type of contract. If 
Pacific wanted to exercise better control over the 
useage [sic] of material its [sic] should have had a 
representative (typically an engineer) on site to see 
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that material was being properly used. During the 
performance of much of the work in Plat B Pacific had 
such a representative on site. During the performance 
of work on Plat C Pacific had no such representative 
on site. The Arbitrator does not find that the 
evidence supports a finding that Orton wasted 
material. There was evidence presented by Pacific 
that more material was used in Plat C than maybe 
Pacific thought should be used. Pacific, however, did 
not meet its burden of proof on that issue. The 
computations by Fred Clark were general in nature 
omitting some lengths of pipe installation, [sic] 
assumed that Orton was responsible to cut the road for 
rough grading, etc. 
R. 187-88, Interim Arbitration Award, f22 . As previously mentioned, 
Pacific Development, L.C., upon receiving and reviewing the 
arbitrator's Interim Arbitration Award, objected by way of its Motion 
for Reconsideration, arguing that Orton breached the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing by utilizing over three times the amount 
of fill material reasonably required to complete Plat C. See R. 184, 
Motion for Reconsideration. In support, Pacific Development, L.C., 
cited various Utah cases setting forth and discussing the well-
established implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See id. 
Notwithstanding, the arbitrator thereafter issued his Final 
Arbitration Award, which included the identical paragraph 22 as that 
previously set forth in the temporary Interim Arbitration Award. R. 
140, Final Arbitration Award, H22. The arbitrator included the 
following additional paragraph in the final award: 
Pacific's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The 
Arbitrator heard the arguments during the course of 
the proceeding that are being reargued by Pacific. 
Pacific's argument is based largely upon its argument 
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that Orton had within its scope of work the obligation 
to perform the rough grading of the roadway. The 
Arbitrator specifically found that the contract did 
not require that work to be done by Orton. Orton 
obviously has a duty of good faith and fair dealing 
with Pacific. The Arbitrator, however, further found 
that Pacific did not [sic] its burden of proof of its 
allegation that Orton wasted material in Plat C. 
See id. at R. 138, ^25 (emphasis added). 
By ruling in paragraph 22 of the Final Arbitration Award that 
the problem "appears to be inherent" in the unit price contract 
entered into by the parties, and that if "Pacific wanted to exercise 
better control over the useage [sic] of the material its [sic] should 
have had a representative (typically an engineer) on site to see that 
material was being property used", the arbitrator manifestly 
disregarded the well-established contract principle that each party 
to a contract has an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
with the other party to the contract. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1994). 
By way of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, "each 
party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or purposely 
do anything that will destroy or injure the other party's right to 
receive the fruits of the contract." Id. (citing Bastian v. Cedar 
Hills Investment & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981); Ferris v. 
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979)); see also Republic Group, Inc. v. 
Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing St. 
Benedict's Dev., 811 P.2d at 199-200; Andalex Resources, Inc., 871 
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P.2d 1041, 1047-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). "A violation of the 
covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contract." Id. The 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is especially applicable 
where, as in the instant case, one party under the contract grants 
the other party discretion to determine such terms as quantity, 
price, or time of performance. See, e.g., Cook v. Zions First 
National Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Deliberate disregard of the law concerning the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by the arbitrator is further demonstrated by 
his acknowledgment that the parties entered into a unit price 
contract and his detailed discussion of the inherent "problems" with 
such contracts. In direct contravention to this acknowledgment and 
discussion, the arbitrator then ruled that u [i]f Pacific wanted to 
exercise better control over the useage [sic] of material its [sic] 
should have had a representative (typically an engineer) on site to 
see that material was being property used." In the course of 
utilizing this as the basis for its ruling, the arbitrator not only 
manifestly disregarded the principles of law regarding the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair, but it implied a new term in the 
unit contract entered into by the parties by requiring that Pacific 
in fact hire an employee, i.e., an engineer, to monitor the fill 
material utilized by Orton in the course of completing Plat C. See 
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P. 2d 743, 749 (Utah 
1982) (holding that "this court will not rewrite a contract to supply 
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terms which the parties omitted."). By requiring this, the 
arbitrator essentially relieved Orton of the duty to act both in good 
faith and fairly with Pacific Development, L.C.12 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Pacific Development, L.C, respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the district court's Order 
Confirming the Arbitrator's Award and remand the case with 
instructions to vacate the arbitrator's award and to determine an 
award of attorney fees and costs for Pacific Development, L.C, 
incurred on appeal as well as the entry of any orders or proceedings 
consistent with this Court's instructions set forth in its Opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Or) day of May, 1999. 
WIGGINS, P.C 
Attorney, 
12Paragraph 2 5 of the Final Arbitration Award demonstrates that 
the arbitrator appreciated the existence of the clearly governing 
legal principle concerning the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing but decided to ignore or pay no attention to it. 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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